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Abstract In comparing an immediate life annuity with a payout-equivalent
investment fund payout plan (self-annuitization), research to date has focused
mainly on shortfall probabilities of self-annuitization. As an exception, Schme-
iser and Post (2005) propose a family strategy where the chances of self-annu-
itization (i.e., bequests) are taken into consideration as well. In such a family
strategy, potential heirs must bear shortfall risks, but in return have a chance
of receiving a bequest. This paper analyzes under which conditions heirs will
be willing to agree to a family strategy. The idea of a family strategy is inte-
grated into a realistically calibrated intertemporal expected utility framework,
taking into account risks arising from stochastic life span, asset returns, and
nontradable labor income. A family strategy is shown to be accepted for many
parameter combinations, especially in families with lowmarginal tax rates, if the
heirs are wealthy, or in a case where the retiree has an average population life
expectancy. We also work out how family self-annuitization decisions interact
with asset allocation, saving decisions, and labor income risk. Under realistic
conditions our results support two explanations for the empirically observable
low demand for annuities (the so-called annuity puzzle), namely intra-family
risk sharing and high cost of market-annuitization.
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1 Introduction
According to Yaari’s (1965) seminal paper, expected utility maximizers without
bequest motives should annuitize their entire wealth, given a fair life annu-
ity market. This result was recently confirmed by Davidoff et al. (2005) under
more general assumptions about utility functions. However, annuity markets
are, in general, far from being perfect since only unfairly priced annuities are
available due to adverse selection1 and transaction costs (Mitchell et al. 1999;
von Gaudecker and Weber 2004). In this context, several authors propose self-
annuitization strategies in order to beat the market-annuitization benchmark
(e.g., Milevsky et al. 1997; Milevsky and Robinson 2000; Albrecht and Maurer
2002; Milevsky and Young 2003, 2005; Blake et al. 2003; Young 2004; Milevsky
2005; Schmeiser and Post 2005). The self-annuitization strategies are individual
payout plans—typically investment-fund based—that attempt to replicate the
payout stream of a life annuity. The literature mainly focuses on the shortfall
risk of self-annuitization strategies and shows that—dependent on the riskiness
of the asset allocation and the annuity buyer’s age—it is possible to minimize,
but never fully eliminate, shortfall risk in the case of fixed-payout annuities.
This means that there is always a risk of outliving one’s money.2
Schmeiser and Post (2005) argue that knowing only the probability of out-
living one’s money does not provide enough information for the self- versus
market-annuitization decision because self-annuitization strategies bring about
risks and chances. Self-annuitization strategies—in contrast with traditional life
annuities—create the chance to bequeath wealth if a retiree does not outlive his
money. However, a retiree in pursuit of a self-annuitization strategy would have
to bear the shortfall risks, whereas the chances (i.e., bequests) are on the heirs’
side (if the retiree has no utility of bequest). Schmeiser and Post (2005) propose
a family strategy where heirs bear both chances and risks. The starting point
of this strategy is an insurance company’s offer of an immediately beginning
life annuity. Instead of investing money in this annuity, the retiree is offered
a second alternative. He invests the money in an investment fund and gener-
ates the same payout stream that would have been provided by the insurance
company. In this family strategy, the future heirs have to bear the risk that the
fund will be exhausted during the retiree’s lifetime. In contrast to the market
insurance alternative, however, there is still a chance to inherit a share of the
money invested. The family might also save costs of adverse selection—assum-
ing symmetric information within the family—and transaction costs—assuming
1 The facts that typical annuitants have an above average life expectancy and that annuities are
priced according to their mortality makes annuities “unfair” for the average population.
2 In the case of a variable-payout annuity Milevsky and Young (2005) show that under certain
assumptions it is possible to find a self-annuitization strategy that dominates the payout of the
annuity.
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a certain level of mutual trust and honesty within the family (Kotlikoff and
Spivak 1981).
Utilizing a simulation-based technique Schmeiser and Post (2005) calculate
the probability distribution of the cash flows of the family strategy at a certain
point in time. Even though the chance and risk profile of the family strategy
looks promising, there is still no clear indication as to whether heirs would
be willing to act as insurance providers, since no utility-based valuation of the
cash-flow distribution has yet been done. Hence, it is still unknown whether the
chances of such a family strategy are high enough to compensate for the risks
taken.
The goal of this paper is to analyze under which conditions—especially with
respect to preferences, financial wealth position, biometric risks, and marginal
taxation rates—heirs will be willing to agree to a family strategy.
In our model, the idea of a family strategy is integrated into a realistically
calibrated discrete time—intertemporal consumption/saving—expected utility
framework. We calibrate our model to account for risks arising from stochas-
tic life span, asset returns, and nontradable labor income. A family strategy is
shown to be accepted for many parameter combinations, especially in families
with low marginal tax rates, if the heirs are very wealthy, or in a case where
the retiree has an average population life expectancy. Outside the family or
annuitization context similar frameworks were recently applied by Gomes and
Michaelides (2003, 2005), Dammon et al. (2004), and Cocco et al. (2005), as
well as Rodepeter and Winter (2005).
The paper contributes to the optimal annuitization literature that considers
family relations in the retirement context. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) analyzed
annuitization decisions in larger families. Brown and Poterba (2000), and Vidal
and Lejárraga (2006) focused on married couples. The main source of uncer-
tainty in these expected utility models stems from the stochastic life span of
the family members. Our model shows that also under more realistic condi-
tions, i.e., in a model with asset return and labor income uncertainty, family self
-annuitization proves to be optimal in many situations. We also work out how
family self-annuitization decisions interact with the asset allocation and saving
decisions and labor income risk. Our results support both the ideas that intra-
family risk sharing (Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981) and high cost of market-annu-
itization (Mitchell et al. 1999) explain the annuity puzzle, i.e. the empirically
found low annuity demand.3
The paper is organized as follows. We start with a detailed description of
our family strategy in section 2. Thereafter, in section 3, the formal expected
utility model is established and calibrated with German empirical data. Then,
in section 4, numerical results are presented using different input parameters.
We finish with section 5, by discussing general requirements for the strategy
and some limitations of the concept when put into practice.
3 Another explanation for low annuity demand is the crowding-out effect of government pensions
(Mitchell et al. 1999), which means that government pensions function as a substitute for private
pensions.
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2 The family strategy
The family strategy proposed in this paper is similar to the one described in
Schmeiser and Post (2005) but includes some adjustments required for its inte-
gration into an intertemporal expected utility model. The starting point is a
retiree who is concerned about his future financial situation, given uncertainty
about how long he will live. He is endowed with a certain amount of wealth
that he intends to utilize for his old age provision. For this purpose, he consid-
ers two alternatives. The first alternative is simple: he places his money with
an insurance company and in return receives an immediate life annuity. The
second alternative—the focus of this paper—is the family strategy. The retiree
hands his money over to his heir, who promises to pay a life annuity-equivalent
payment stream. To guarantee these payments, the heir is required to deposit
a collateral of sufficient size, which means this strategy will work only in cases
where the heir possesses at least a certain amount of wealth. In principle, the
retiree is indifferent between the two alternatives described. Furthermore, one
has to bear in mind that—as in Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)—a certain level of
mutual trust and honesty within the family is required. Otherwise, contractual,
monitoring, adverse selection or other additional costs could practically always
exceed the cost of market annuitization.
The heir’s aim is to maximize the expected utility of his lifetime consump-
tion. If he refuses to serve as an annuity provider, he cannot expect any bequest.
Whenproviding the life annuity, the chances—of course,measuredonly in finan-
cial terms—lie in receiving the bequest, whereas financial risks arise from the
fact that the retiree may outlive the money reserved for the annuity, and there-
fore the heir’s own capital will be reduced. This could happen if the retiree lives
an unexpectedly long time and/or there is a poor development in the capital
market.
The heir’s optimization problem takes into account the risks from asset
returns, labor income, his own life span, and—via the expectation about the pay-
ment time of the annuity-equivalent-payment stream—the retiree’s life span.
Besides deciding whether to provide a life annuity, the heir’s decision variables
are the asset allocation of his portfolio and his consumptions/savings in each
future year of his life.
3 The model framework
3.1 The heir’s decision problem
In this section, the integration of the heir’s decision problem into a discrete
time—intertemporal consumption/saving—expected utility framework is de-
scribed. In the following, the time t is measured in years; all monetary values
are stated in nominal and after-tax terms. The heir maximizes the utility of
consumption C over his remaining stochastic lifetime using an intertemporal-
separable utility function U(C) with the form:
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U (C) =
T−x∑
t=0
δtUt (Ct). (1)
T denotes his maximum lifespan, x his current age, and δ the subjective dis-
count factor. Assuming the heir to have no bequest motive, the one-period
utility function Ut(Ct), which displays constant relative risk aversion of γ , is
given by:
Ut (Ct) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Log
(
Ct
(1+π)t
)
, with γ = 1
(
Ct
(1+π)t
)1−γ −1
1−γ , otherwise,
(2)
as long as the heir lives and 0 otherwise. Ct stands for nominal consumption at
time t and is adjusted for an inflation rate π .
At each point in time t the heir must decide how much to consume (which
implicitly determines his savings) and how to invest the remaining savings (via
the chosen asset allocation). Let the heir have financial wealth W0, henceforth
called “cash on hand” (Deaton 1991). If the heir decides to participate in the
family strategy, his cash on hand is increased by the insurance premium P,
transferred from the retiree. In return for this amount, he is obliged to pay an
annuity A each year (paid out at the end of each year) to the retiree as long as
the retiree lives. Savings St are allocated to both a risk-free investment and a
risky investment. The proportion invested riskily each period, αt, earns the risky
return Rt whereas the rest (1 – αt) is compounded at the risk-free return Rf .
We assume that the heir cannot borrow money or short-sell stocks. Stochastic
(net) labor income Lt is received by the heir from age x to age 64 at the end of
each year t. Furthermore, in order to guarantee that the retiree will be at least
as well off under the family strategy as he would have been under the insurer’s
annuity plan, the risk-free proportion (1 – αt) of St is required to be at least as
large as a collateral, colt, which will be specified below.
The heir must decide at t = 0 whether he will take part in the family strat-
egy. To make an optimal decision, the heir maximizes expected lifetime utility,
first without and then with the family strategy. He chooses the alternative that
provides the highest expected utility. Hence, the maximization problem in the
case where the heir decides to provide the annuity is given by:
max
αt ,Ct
E0 (U (C)) , (3)
subject to consumption constraints:
C0 = W0 + P − S0
Ct = St−1
(
1 − αt−1
)
Rf + St−1αt−1Rt−1 − At−1 + Lt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wt
−St
∀t ∈ {1, 2, ...,T − x} ,
(4)
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subject to borrowing/collateral size constraints:
col0 ≤ S0 ≤ W0 + P
colt ≤ St ≤ Wt ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ...,T − x} , (5)
subject to collateral investment constraints:
colt ≤ St (1 − αt) ∀t ∈ {0, 1, ...,T − x} , (6)
and subject to no-short-sale constraints:
0 ≤ αt ≤ 1. (7)
Wt stands for cash on hand at time t. At equals the annuity payout A as long
the retiree lives and 0 otherwise. The maximization problem without the family
strategy is obtained by setting P, At and colt to 0.
3.2 Calibration and solving technique
In this subsection, the base parameter configuration of themodel is given. Later,
we vary the subjective discount factor, the relative risk aversion parameter, the
number of heirs, the marginal tax rate, and the mortality of the retiree. We
introduce these alternative parameter values in the results section of the paper.
The financial terms of the family strategy are determined by the individual
characteristics of the retiree. We assume the retiree to be age 65, which is the
statutory retirement age in Germany at present. His wealth, which shall be an-
nuitized completely, is set to 300,000e (=P). Atmarket conditions as of the end
of 2004, this yields a nominal constant annual annuity payment A of 20,514 e,4
given a marginal tax rate of 0%. The retiree’s survival process is modeled using
a cohort life-table based on data from the Federal Statistical Office Germany,
which reflects expected average population mortality as of 2001.5
The heir’s age x is set at 45 and his survival process depends on the same
life-table as the retiree’s.6 The maximum lifespan T according to this table is
121. The heir’s preferences are defined by setting δ = 0.97 and γ = 2 (see, e.g.,
Laibson et al. 1998). His marginal tax rate is, for the present, also set to 0%.
For the inflation rate π , the sample mean of the time series of the German
consumer price index (CPI) from 1950 to 2003 (Federal Statistical Office Ger-
many 2004) is used, resulting in π = 0.0263. Stock returns Rt are assumed to
be i.i.d. and log-normal (e.g., Hull 2005). Distribution parameters are estimated
4 As in Schmeiser and Post (2005), this value is an offer of the Standard Life Insurance Company,
sold in Germany.
5 The assumptions on the development of future mortality are described as “Szenario L3” in
Federal Statistical Office Germany (2003).
6 Nevertheless, given some fixed age for retiree and heir (e.g., 65), the heir has a higher life expec-
tancy than the retiree, since the life-table used is differentiated by the year of birth of a person.
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from a time series of the German stock index, DAX, based on annual data
from 1950 to 2003.7 Taking transaction costs of a DAX index investment fund
of 0.7% p.a. of investment fund volume (paid upfront) into account,8 the esti-
mation delivers a mean E(Rt) of 1.1502 p.a. and a standard deviation Std(Rt)
of 0.3157 p.a. for the log-normally distributed returns. For the risk-free return
Rf we use the sample mean of the annualized return time series of the German
money market from 1950 to 2003, which leads to the value of 1.0481 p.a.,9 after
deducting transaction costs of a money market fund of 0.18% p.a.10
The collateral colt is set to equal the risk-free discounted sum of future
annuity payments A, assuming the retiree reaches the maximum life span of
121.11 Hence, col0 = 395, 777e. Since this amount of cash on hand has to be
invested risk-free (collateral investment constraint (6)), the collateral is large
enough to guarantee that—independent of the retiree’s/heir’s actual life span,
asset returns, and labor income—the annuity payment obligations can always
be met. Bearing in mind the transfer of the insurance premium P of 300,000 e
to the heir, it becomes clear that the heir needs at least 95,777 e cash on hand
in order to participate in the family strategy.
Annual labor income payments Lt are modeled to be independently distrib-
uted and are also independent fromRt. The heir receives labor income from age
45 to 64.E(Lt) is calibrated tomatch an empirically observed, hump-shaped life-
cycle-income profile. The heir’s initial labor income is set to 30,000e. This value
is used as the starting point of the life-cycle-income profile. Expected growth-
rates of labor income are based on Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002), and
Behr et al. (2003).
Stochastic shocks to labor income enter the model from two sources. First,
with probability of 1% the heir may become unemployed and receive public
welfare for the current year (Lauer 2003, p. 28 and 35; Wilke 2005, p. 213 and
234).12 In this event, he is entitled to welfare benefits of Lut = 8, 000e · (1+ π)t
(Federal Statistical Office Germany 2002, p. 208). With probability of 99% the
heir is employed. In this case—to account for labor income risks other than
unemployment—his labor income Let is log-normally distributed. The mean of
the log-normal distribution E(Let ) is set to 1/0.99· [E(Lt) – 0.01 · 8,000 e · (1 +
7 We are greatly indebted to Professor R. Stehle, Ph.D., Chair of Banking and Stock Exchanges,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Germany), for providing us with the time series of the DAX.
8 After consulting various online brokers, we found that this annual management fee is the com-
petitive price (as of 2004).
9 See the IMF International Financial Statistics Online database, http:WWW.//ifs.apdi.net/imf.
10 See footnote 8.
11 Formally, this means that colt = A ∑T−65−tj=1 R
−j
f .
12 In reality, unemployment/welfare risk is above 1% p.a., the average duration of unemploy-
ment, however, is shorter than 1 year (e.g., Lauer 2003; Wilke 2005). In general, a more realistic
unemployment model would have to take into account the stochastic occurrence and duration of
unemployment. Therefore, in the discrete time model used here, where time progresses in steps
of years, the probability to become unemployed at all is below the real-world probability, but the
duration lies above the average duration of unemployment.
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Table 1 Base Parameter Configuration
Parameter Value
Age of the retiree 65
Insurance premium P 300,000 e
Collateral at t = 0 col0 395,777 e
Annual annuity payment A 20,514 e
Age of the heir x 45
Maximum lifespan T 121
Mortality Population average
Relative risk aversion γ 2
Subjective discount factor δ 0.97
Marginal tax rate 0%
Inflation π 0.0263
Log-normal stock return Rt
Expected return E(Rt) 1.1502
Standard deviation of return Std(Rt) 0.3157
Risk-free return Rf 1.0481
Log-normal labor income Lt
Initial value of the heir’s income profile 30,000 e
Expected income E(Lt) Life-cycle-income profile
Unemployment probability 1%
Unemployment/welfare benefits Lut 8, 000e · (1 + π)t
Standard deviation when not unemployed Std(Let ) 20%
π)t]13. The standard deviation Std(Let ) is set to 20% (Rodepeter and Winter
(2005)).
Table 1 summarizes the base parameter configuration used.
The optimization problem (3)–(7) is solved backward via stochastic dynamic
programming. The Bellman equation for this problem depends on three state
variables: time t, cash on hand Wt, and the life status of the retiree (a = alive
and d = dead). Let pht (p
r
t ) denote the probability of the heir (retiree) at time t
to survive to t + 1, the Bellman equation (with V denoting the value function)
is given by, t = 0, 1, . . . ,T − x − 1,
Vdt (Wt) = max
αt ,Ct
{
Ut (Ct) + pht δ Et
(
Vdt+1
(
Wt+1
))}
, (8)
subject to constraints (4)–(7), if the retiree is dead, and
Vat (Wt)=max
αt ,Ct
{
Ut (Ct)+pht δ
[
prtEt
(
Vat+1
(
Wt+1
))+(1−prt
)
Et
(
Vdt+1
(
Wt+1
))]}
,
(9)
13 This adjustment guarantees that E(Lt) lies on the life-cycle-income profile. The E(Lt) can be
calculated if unemployment risk is taken into account, i.e., 0.01 · Lut + 0.99 ·E(Let ) = 0.01 · 8, 000e ·
(1 + π)t + 0.99 · 1/0.99 · [E(Lt) − 0.01 · 8, 000e · (1 + π)t] = E(Lt).
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subject to constraints (4)–(7), if the retiree is alive. In the last period, the remain-
ing wealth is consumed and the value function is simply given by UT−x(WT−x).
The Bellman equations (8) and (9) cannot be solved analytically and hence a
numerical technique is used.14 The basic algorithm operates as follows. First, at
each point in time t the Wt-state space is discretized into I ∈ N points Wit with
i = 1, 2, . . ., I. The upper and lower bounds of this Wit -grid were chosen to
be nonbinding in all periods. Since in the last period, i.e., at t = T − x, the
value function VT−x(WT−x) is given by UT−x(WT−x), the numerical solution
algorithm starts at the penultimate period, i.e., at t = T − x − 1. The Bell-
man equations (8) and (9) are solved for each Wit using the Mathematica

5.1 implemented nonlinear optimizer NMaximize.15 For each Wit this yields
the optimal decisions αit(W
i
t), C
i
t(W
i
t) and the function value of Vt(W
i
t). Next, a
continuous function is fitted to the points Vt(Wit),
16 which delivers a continuous
approximation of the value function Vt(Wt). Finally, the problem is rolled back
to the preceding period.
4 Results
4.1 Base parameter configuration
As explained in the previous section, the heir decides whether to participate in
the family strategy by comparing his expected utility for both alternatives. The
difference in utility can—as welfare gain (or loss) of the family strategy—be
expressed in e-terms. For this purpose, we apply an equivalent wealth cal-
culation, i.e., we calculate how much additional cash on hand W0 the heir
would need in the situation without the family strategy in order to make him
indifferent between the two alternatives (Brown 2001). The results of this cal-
culation are shown in Figure 1 for different amounts of W0.
If the heir has cash on hand of 224Te, he will be indifferent between par-
ticipating or not in the family strategy. Above (below) that amount, he would
(would not) like to participate in the family strategy. Figure 1 illustrates that
the whole decision problem is wealth driven, i.e., the welfare gain is higher the
richer the heir is at t = 0.
In principle, the family strategy is an investment with an expected finan-
cial gain of 84Te, which equals the life annuity’s loading.17 But since this
14 The authors thank Roman Schulze (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Germany)) for his invalu-
able ideas during the development of this solving technique.
15 The risky return and labor income distributions were also discretized to keep the optimization
problem tractable.
16 The fitting algorithm is based on the Mathematica 5.1 implemented least-squares fitter Fit.
The method used here guarantees that the relative risk aversion displayed by the optimal decisions
αit(W
i
t ), C
i
t(W
i
t ) is inherited to the continuous approximation of the value function Vt(Wt).
17 The insurance load is calculated as follows: market premium P (here, 300,000 e) minus
fair insurance premium Pfair. The fair premium is calculated in the following way: Pfair =
A
∑T−65
t=1
[
R−tf
∏t
i=1 pri−1
]
.
274 T. Post et al.
Fig. 1 The family strategy’s welfare gain W0 of the heir in Thousand e (Te)
investment is also risky, the welfare gain measured by the value function is in
general reduced by a risk premium. Since the proportion of both the risk for
providing an annuity and the labor income risk decreases in the heir’s overall
portfolio the richer he is, the annuity is evaluated closer to its expected value.18
Furthermore, the wealthier the heir is, the less he is restricted (i.e., the less
utility is lost) by the constraints (5)–(7).
In the following, we discuss some of the optimal saving/consumption and
asset allocation decisions derived in the optimization process. In Figure 2,
the optimal investment decisions at t = 0, α0, are shown. Here, we look only at
the case where the heir provides the annuity, which, based on Figure 1, is when
the heir has cash on hand of at least 224Te. In contrast with Figure 1, the values
are now given as a function in (W0 + P), since this is the amount of money the
heir has to work with after having received the premium P (=300Te) from the
retiree. Optimal decisions for an heir who does not participate in the family
strategy are given in the Appendix.
The straight line in Figure 2 shows the optimal asset allocation decision of
an investor without background risk in his portfolio, i.e., without labor income
and without annuity provision (α0 ≈ 67%19). The gray curve shows the optimal
asset allocation decision for that part of the heir’s savings that are not required
by the borrowing/collateral size and collateral investment constraints (5)–(6).
This curve demonstrates that when providing the annuity and thus having to
invest the collateral risk free, the heir would want to increase his risky position
to more than 100% if he has a low amount of cash on hand (W0). In our model
this is not possible because of the no-short-sale constraint (7). The more cash
on hand the heir possesses, the more he can—outside the collateral—invest
18 This is a consequence of the constant relative risk aversion specification of the one-period utility
function (2), which implies decreasing absolute risk aversion (Gollier 2001, pp. 17–37).
19 α0 is independent of the amount of cash on hand because of the constant relative risk aversion
specification of the one-period utility function (2). See, e.g., Lenoir and Tuchschmid (2001) for an
analysis of asset allocation decisions in such a situation.
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Fig. 2 Optimal decisions of the heir at t = 0 when participating in the family strategy: asset
allocation α0
riskily and this is why the optimal asset allocation curve including the collateral
(black curve) begins with a positive slope. For larger amounts of cash on hand
this curve converges to the optimal decision of an investor without background
risk (straight line). Why does the black line not approach the straight line from
below? The reason lies in the role that labor income plays in our model: labor
income serves to some extent as a “nearly risk-free” asset for the heir (see, e.g.,
Spremann and Winhart 1998, Cocco et al. 2005). Together with the collateral,
the heir is now “toomuch” invested in risk-free assets compared to the situation
without annuity provision and labor income. The heir tries to offset this effect
by investing more riskily than he would have done without labor income and
the annuity provision.20 For very large amounts of cash on hand, labor income
and the collateral become more and more unimportant in comparison to the
heir’s overall wealth position and therefore α0 converges to the straight line at
about 67%.
In the following Figure 3 we show optimal saving decisions (S0) at time t = 0.
The different effects creating a U-shaped savings function (black curve) can-
not be separated easily because of the complex interaction between the various
risks and constraints in our model. First, savings are below the savings of an
investor without background risk, i.e., without labor income and without annu-
ity provision (in this case α0 is around 95%), since the expectation of receiving
labor income in future periods reduces the need for savings. This effect will be
reduced with increasing W0, since labor income becomes smaller in proportion
to the value of the heir’s whole portfolio, causing the increase in the savings
20 Another reason for the increase in the risky position here is the diversification effect of stochas-
tic labor income, which is uncorrelated with the risky asset (see Gollier 2001, pp. 141–154). The
effect of labor income which leads to an increase in the desired investment into the risky asset can
also be seen in Appendix, where the optimal decisions of an heir not participating in the family
strategy are shown.
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Fig. 3 Optimal decisions of the heir at t = 0 when participating in the family strategy: savings S0
function right of * in Figure 3 (see Carroll and Kimball 1996).21 Second, a
decreasing savings function for low levels of wealth is caused by the borrow-
ing/collateral size constraint (5). Constraint (5) is not binding at t = 0—which
can be seen from the existence of “voluntary” savings (gray curve “savings
above col0” in Figure 3). But the “fear” of arriving at future periods in regions
where constraint (5) does bind, drives up savings (Deaton 1991) the less cash
on hand is available (left of * in Figure 3). This motive is stronger the lower
(W0 +P) is, i.e., the savings function increases with decreasing (W0 +P). Third,
a similar effect, i.e., an effect that drives up savings for lower levels of wealth
and vanishes for higher levels, is induced by the collateral investment constraint
(6), forcing the heir to invest the amount col0 risk free. This reduces expected
lifetime wealth because the return from this risk-free investment is lower than
the expected return from the optimal portfolio without this constraint. Lower
future wealth drives up savings because of the desire to smooth consumption
over the life-cycle.22
4.2 Parameter variations
In this section we show how variation of some of the input parameters of the
optimization problem given in Equations (3)–(7) influences the heir’s optimal
decisions and welfare gain (W0). We start with variations of the heir’s prefer-
ence parameters. Figure 4 compares thewelfare gain through the family strategy
of an heir with a subjective discount factor of δ = 0.97 (the original situation
shown in Figure 1) with the welfare gain of an heir who has a subjective discount
factor of δ = 0.95.
21 The effect of labor income to decrease savings can also be seen in Appendix where the optimal
decisions of an heir not participating in the family strategy are shown.
22 Gollier (2001), p. 223 shows this effect in the case of a change of the risk-free rate of return.
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Fig. 4 The family strategy’s welfare gain W0 of the heir in Te; δ = 0.97 versus δ = 0.95
Fig. 5 The family strategy’s welfare gain W0 of the heir in Te; γ = 2 versus γ = 1
With δ = 0.95, the attractiveness of the family strategy is reduced, given a
certain amount of W0, because a lower δ reduces future utility of consumption
and therefore reduces the desired level of savings. Hence, the borrowing/collat-
eral size investment constraint (5) is more likely to be binding in future periods,
which costs utility.
In Figure 5, we analyze the influence of different levels of constant relative
risk aversion γ of the one-period utility function (2) on the welfare gain (W0)
of the heir.
On the one hand, decreasing relative risk aversion makes an individual more
likely to accept risky gambles (in this case, taking part in the family strategy) and
hence one would expect an increase inW0. An increase ofW0 should also be
supported by the fact that in the framework and calibration used in this model,
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Fig. 6 The family strategy’s welfare gain W0 of the heir in Te; one versus two heirs
a lower γ leads to higher savings,23 and hence the borrowing/collateral size
constraint (5) is less likely to be binding in future periods. On the other hand,
a lower γ increases the propensity to invest riskily, which makes the risk-free
investment of the collateral required by the collateral investment constraint (6)
more painful for the heir (hence, W0 decreases). Another effect that leads
to a reduction of W0 is that, in our setting, the wealth effect of future labor
income is much smaller for an heir with γ = 1.24 The last two effects outweigh
the first two, so that in our calibration the overall W0 decreases.25
A family strategy may often be based on the cooperation of several future
heirs, typically several children. To get an insight into the effects resulting from
such cooperation, we analyze in Figure 6 the situation where two identically
equipped26 heirs participate in equal proportions in the family strategy. Hence,
P (annuity premium), A (annuity payout), and colt (collateral) are halved. All
other input parameters are as described in the base parameter configuration
(leading to the results shown in Figures 1, 2).
Figure 6 illustrates that the minimum amount of W0 necessary for agreeing
to the family strategy is heavily reduced per heir because the risk resulting in
providing the annuity is smaller in proportion to the overall portfolio of each
23 See also Gollier (2001), pp. 223–224, 235–248, and 269–283.
24 Usually, the wealth effect would be expected to be larger for a γ = 1 investor since he is less risk
averse. In our calibration, the no-short-sale constraint (7) leads to a comparatively smaller wealth
effect of labor income: the gain from diversification by adding stochastic labor income—leading to
an increase of the risky investment αt—is 0 for a γ = 1 investor because such an investor already
chooses the riskiest asset allocation allowed (regardless of the cash on hand W0).
25 We also checked our calculations with a relative risk aversion parameter of γ = 3. These calcu-
lations support our explanations for the “γ -effect”.With γ = 3, especially the collateral investment
constraint (6) is less likely to be binding, since a more risk averse heir wants to invest less money
into the risky asset. Consequently the minimum amount of cash on hand to convince the heir to
participate in the family strategy decreases to 148Te, whereas the welfare gain W0 increases.
26 This means that both heirs have the same cash on hand, labor income, marginal tax rate, pref-
erences, age, sex, and mortality.
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Fig. 7 The family strategy’s welfare gain W0 of the heir in Te; 0% versus 36%marginal tax rate
heir. One can also see that the minimum amount of W0 required for participa-
tion does not shrink by 50%. As a result of the constant relative risk aversion
feature of the one-period utility function (2), this would be the case only if the
labor income were halved as well.
In the next variation, illustrated in Figure 7, the tax situation is changed.
Now the retiree and the heir each have a marginal tax rate of 36%. In gen-
eral, according to German income tax law, interest and dividends are subject
to taxation but capital gains are not. Annuity payouts are treated only partially
(18%) as taxable income. This changes the annual annuity payment A to 19,185
e, E(Rt) to 1.1360, Std(Rt) to 0.3119, and Rf to 1.0302.27 To avoid pure income
effects, we used the same labor income stream after taxation as in previous
scenarios. All other input parameters are as described in the base parameter
configuration (leading to the results shown in Figures 1, 2).
In the case of a 36% marginal tax rate, the welfare gain through the family
strategyW0 is enormously reduced. There are fourmain reasons for this. First,
annuities enjoy a comparative advantage over other investments since only a
small proportion of annuity payouts is taxed. This effect reduces the insurance
load from 84Te to 63Te,28 which makes the family strategy generally less
attractive to the heir. Second, the desired proportion of risky investment αt is
generally increased because capital gains are not taxed under German tax law.
Therefore, the utility reducing collateral investment constraint (6) and the no-
short-sale constraint (7) aremore likely to be binding.Third, since the necessary
27 Details and references explaining tax adjustments in Germany can be found in Schmeiser and
Post (2005). Note that due to an amendment of the income tax law, the proportion taxable of the
annuity payout decreased to 18% (compared to 27% used in Schmeiser and Post 2005).
28 This result is obtained using the formula shown in footnote 16 for the calculation of the fair
premium, setting A to 19,185 e and Rf to 1.0302 while holding the survival probabilities constant.
The insurance load can be calculated by subtracting the fair premium (237Te) from the market
premium (300Te).
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amount of collateral colt is calculated by discounting future annuity payments
with Rf , a reduction of Rf , e.g., increases col0 by 119Te (from 396 to 515Te),
making the borrowing/collateral size constraint (5) more likely to be binding.
Fourth, as already demonstrated, the decision problem is highly wealth driven.
Given a certain amount of cash on hand W0, an heir with a 36% marginal tax
rate simply has less wealth over his lifetime than an heir with a 0% marginal
tax rate. This causes a reduction of W0 as well.
In our last scenario, we again use the situation given in Figure 7 (36% mar-
ginal tax rate), but assume that the retiree has a higher than average life expec-
tancy. This case is chosen to incorporate empirical evidence that wealthier
people generally have an above average life expectancy (e.g., Brown 2003).
This parameter combination leads to a situation where the family strategy is
very rarely attractive (the “worst-case” scenario for the strategy). In the follow-
ing calculation, we use the German life-table “DAV 1994 R” (see Schmithals
and Schütz 1995), which reflects the higher life expectancy of typical annuity
buyers.29 The mortality assumptions about the heir are held constant (average
population mortality) in order to make the results easier to compare with the
outcome given in Figure 7 where both heir and retiree have an average life
expectancy.
The negative influence of using annuitant mortality on W0 is not surpris-
ing, taking into account that the insurance load decreases further from 63Te
to 27Te. This clearly makes the family strategy less attractive.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We derived the optimal decisions and calculated welfare gains from a family
oriented self-annuitization strategy in a realistically calibrated intertemporal
consumption/saving framework. Our results show that participating in a family
strategy can be optimal if the heir has a certain amount of wealth (see in partic-
ular Figures 1, 4, 6). In such a situation, families can reach a Pareto-improved
position by choosing the family strategy as their retirement arrangement. They
also may alter the terms of such an agreement in order to divide welfare gains
between both generations (retiree and heir). In such case, thewelfare gain curve
(e.g., in Figure 1) shifts downward by the amount of money transferred from
the heir to the retiree under a “welfare gain sharing agreement.” Consequently,
the minimum amount of cash on hand necessary for participation in the family
strategy shifts to the right, i.e., the heir needs to be wealthier to make the family
strategy an acceptable choice.
We have seen that the decision problem is wealth driven, i.e., the more cash
on hand the heir has, the more likely it is that he would like to participate in
this strategy, which is a possible drawback to our concept of a family strategy.
29 By using this annuitant life-table instead of the table of the Federal StatisticalOffice ofGermany,
the life expectancy of the retiree is increased by 3.4 years. Differences in life expectancy between
the general population and annuitants can be explained by adverse selection effects. The life-table
DAV 1994 R is also a cohort table, i.e., a table that differentiates mortality by the year of birth.
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Fig. 8 The family strategy’s welfare gain W0 of the heir in Te; 36% marginal tax rate, average
versus annuitant mortality
The heir’s above average wealth is positively correlated to the above average
wealth of the retiree (e.g., Zimmermann 1992; Dustmann 2004). This again is
correlated to above average life expectancy of the retiree (Brown 2003). Fur-
thermore, wealthier people are generally in higher income tax brackets. Both
effects, i.e., high life expectancy and high tax rates, make a family strategy rather
unattractive (see Figures 7, 8).
Another assumption influencing the attractiveness of the family strategy sub-
stantially is the size of the collateral required for participation. In ourmodel, the
collateral equals the discounted sum of annuity payments if the retiree lived to
be 121 years old. Schmeiser and Post (2005) chose to make the collateral equal
to a (single) annuity premium large enough to provide the required payment
stream.This premium is considerably smaller than colt whichwould c.p. increase
the attractiveness of the family strategy. However, this leads to an additional
risk concerning the decision problem since future annuity prices are not certain
from the perspective of t = 0. This greatly complicates the solving algorithm.
Additionally, the Schmeiser and Post (2005) approach requires a market where
annuities are sold up to an annuitant’s entry age of 120.
From a decision theoretic point of view, it would be interesting to know how
a family strategy would be negotiated inside the family if there is more than
one heir. As shown in Figure 6, the desired proportion of annuity provision by
each heir depends on his individual characteristics, e.g., cash on hand. This may
lead to controversies over participation shares. However, it should be possible
to find some scheme of participation that all family members could agree to and
benefit from since a starting prerequisite for a family strategy is a certain level
of mutual trust and honesty (as in Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981). Otherwise, the
whole scheme would be subject to moral hazard concerns. The retiree might
fear that the heirs would try to renegotiate the deal if he lives longer than
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expected or the stock market performs poorly or the heirs become unemployed
and thus suffer a drop in income (Schmeiser and Post 2005).
In summary, in our realistically calibrated model, the family strategy is ac-
cepted for many parameter combinations. It is especially suitable for families
with low marginal tax rates, wealthy heirs, or where the retiree has an aver-
age population life expectancy.30 For such families, a family strategy should be
seriously considered as retirement arrangement. Under realistic conditions our
results support two explanations of the annuity puzzle, namely intra-family risk
sharing and high cost of market-annuitization.
Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank the anonymous referees for helpful comments.
Appendix: Optimal decisions for an heir not participating in the family strategy
The optimal decisions for an heir who does not participate in the family strategy
are shown in Figures 9 and 10 for the base parameter configuration.
Fig. 9 Optimal decisions for the heir at t = 0 when not participating in the family strategy: asset
allocation α0
Figures 9 and 10 reveal the influence of stochastic labor income on the opti-
mal decisions for an heir not participating in the family strategy. To some extent,
stochastic labor income serves as a risk-free asset, and the heir tries to offset
this effect (shown in Figure 9) by investing more riskily than he or she would
have done without labor income (= straight line, see, e.g., Spremann and Win-
hart 1998, Cocco et al. 2005). Furthermore, future labor income works as a
30 In case of compulsory unisex annuity pricing a family strategy might still be attractive for male
retirees, even if the retiree has a higher than average population life expectancy (Schmeiser and Post
2005). The European Commission recently proposed such pricing for annuities. For government
subsidized annuities unisex pricing is already required in Germany.
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Fig. 10 Optimal decisions for the heir at t = 0 when not participating in the family strategy:
savings S0
substitute for savings, and thus the savings (shown in Figure 10) of an heir with
this sort of income decrease (see Carroll and Kimball 1996) compared to those
of an individual without labor income (= straight line). Both effects will be
reduced with increasing W0, since labor income becomes smaller in proportion
to the value of the heir’s whole portfolio. Thus the optimal decisions approach
the straight lines.
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